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Case No. 20160321-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plain ti.ff/Appellee,

v.
RICHARD SIMON GARCIA,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a sentence for aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0) (West Supp. 2016-2017).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by sentencing Garcia to
prison rather than placing him on probation?

Standard of Review. Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,J8, 40 P.3d 626.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There are no dispositive constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules at
issue in this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts. 1

Midafternoon on 16 September 2014, West Valley City police officers
responded to an aparhnent in west Salt Lake County, based on a report that
three intruders were present. R3. Upon entering the apartment, officers
found a 1nan-who identified himself as Richard Montoya, but who was
later identified as Defendant-slumped over the kitchen table, and who
"kept sliding into the wall." Id. Defendant was also drooling, incoherent,
and unable to stand on his own. Id. Defendant told officers he had taken a
blue pill that he bought from someone else, but did not know what it was.

Id. The officers took Defendant to Pioneer Valley Hospital for treatment. Id.
After the officers left, however, Defendant pulled out an LV. in his arm and
walked away from the hospital. Id.

Because Defendant pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the
statement of probable cause (R3-4), his statement in support of his guilty
plea (R55-61), the presentence report (187-201), and the sentencing hearing
(R175-184). The sentencing transcript is attached as Addendu1n A.
1
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Later that same day, near 6:00 p.m., Anthony King was at work
delivering pizzas when Defendant approached King, who was standing
outside of his car, and asked for a ride. Id. King told Defendant that he
could not give him a ride because it was against his employer's policy to do
so. Id. When King tried to get in his car, Defendant slammed the car door
on King and began hitting him in the face. Id. Defendant "told King it was
life or his car, so King got out and" Defendant stole King's car, an orange
Dodge Neon. Id.
Shortly thereafter, West Valley City officers deployed spikes to stop
the stolen Neon. R4. Defendant successfully swerved the Neon to avoid the
first set of spikes. Id. However, when Defendant swerved to avoid a second
set of spikes, he lost control of the Neon, striking both a wooden power pole
and a chain link fence.

Id. After crashing the Neon, Defendant and his

female passenger fled on foot, but were quickly apprehended.

Id.

Defendant was again taken to Pioneer Valley Hospital to get treatment for
injuries sustained in the crash. Id. One of the officers who responded to the
hospital after the crash hnmediately recognized Defendant as the same
incoherent man officers had encountered earlier that day, and who had
falsely identified himself as another man. Id. Further investigation revealed
that Defendant's driver's license was suspended and that he had active

-3-

warrants. Id.

Defendant's female cohort had drug paraphernalia and a

knife on her person. Id.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony;
false information to a law enforcement officer, a class A misdemeanor;
failure to stop at command of a law officer, a class A misdemeanor; and
driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class C
misdemeanor. Rl-3.
Following plea negotiations, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony. R55-61; R157-174. Defendant's signed plea
statement indicated that he "unlawfully and :intentionally took a motor
vehicle from another person by use of force or fear." R56. The remaining
charges were dismissed, along with Defendant's charges in two other cases.
R55; R160.

The presentence report (PSR) detailed Defendant's extensive criminal
history, including his poor supervision history. R188,193-197. Three out of
four times Defendant had been previously granted probation, his probation
was revoked as unsuccessful. See Rl 93-194. Defendant had also served
sentences in both state and federal prison.

-4-

R188.

Given Defendant's

extensive criminal history, which included two prior violent felonies, and
his poor supervision history, the PSR recommended the statutory prison
term of five years to life. R188.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to
consider sentencing Defendant "one degree lower to a one to 15." R178. In
support, counsel argued that Defendant was on the wait list for treatment at
Odyssey House, that he had been on the wait list for "many months," and
that it usually takes "nine, 10, 12 months to get into the program.

11

Id.

Defense counsel also argued that Defendant had taken advantage of other
treatment opportunities, that he was 45 years old and thus "getting to the
point where most people age out of criminal conduct/' that Defendant was
remorsefut and that on the day of the aggravated robbery Defendant had
"taken a medication [Xanax] that he was unaware of/' but that Defendant
was also "acknowledging responsibility." R178-179.
Finally, defense counsel acknowledged that Defendant had "a
substance abuse issue . . . for methamphetamine."

R179.

Although

Defendant had stopped drinking, and also stopped using tobacco and other
drugs, he had not stopped using methamphetamine: "That's a difficult one
to overcome."

Id.

Accordingly, Defendant wanted to "enter a serious

inpatient program to address that, which in this case would be at the

-5-

Odyssey House." Id.

Defense counsel pointed out that Defendant had

"done a fair amount of time in jail on this," and that he "would also do a lot
more jail before he would even be eligible to go to the top of the list at
Odyssey House." Id.
The prosecutor argued that Defendant's history did not show that he
would be successful on probation, or that any sentence other than a prison
term "would be appropriate." R179-180. Indeed, the PSR put Defendant
"firmly in the imprisonment category with the 10 year presumptive initial
sentence." R180. To the extent Defendant asserted that the aggravated
robbery here was induced by his drug activity, the prosecutor pointed out
that "arguably, anything can fall under the header of drug induced
activity," and that while "there are property crimes that people do in order
to obtain drugs," Defendant's crimes were "violent felonies" that were
"[n]ot obviously motivated by any sort of desire for drugs or any desire for
anything other than to behave violently." Id. Given Defendant's history,
including the instant aggravated robbery, the prosecutor argued that
Defendant had shown himself to be "a dangerous individual" who
represented" a significant threat to society." Id. Accordingly, a prison term
was "the only appropriate sanction." Id.

-6-

Defendant also addressed the trial court.

R180.

Defendant

acknowledged that he had "a serious problem" with methamphetamine, but
asked for another chance to address it. Id. Defendant also claimed not to
remember anything about the aggravated robbery, but emphasized that he
was "not trying to minimize" his criminal conduct.

R181.

Rather,

Defendant argued that "if given one more chance or one opportunity," he
could "probably become . . . a good part of society."

Id.

Defendant

acknowledged that probation "would be a serious test" for him, however,
where he "would be out in the streets where there are other controlledwhere there's other substance is, where whatnot, and that's where you
really test my-show my-what I want to do with my life and not just sit
here and give you empty promises." Id. Defendant also acknowledged that
he had previously been enrolled at school, but that he "just messed up," and
lost his "place to live." Id.
The trial court imposed the statutory term of five years to life, and
imposed restitution in the amount of $10,350 to King, and $13,085.54 to
Rocky Mountain Power. R182. The trial court understood that Defendant
wanted another chance at probation, but the court had to "balance"
Defendant's interests with society's interests. Id. Given Defendant's poor
history, including the frightening nature of the aggravated robbery where

-7-

Defendant "found someone, beat him up, and stole his car, ran it into a
telephone post," the trial court concluded Defendant was "a danger, not
only to the person [he] beat up, but everybody on the road in between as
this chase occurred." Id. The trial court thus determined that Defendant
needed "to be in prison." Id.
Defendant timely appealed. R140-141.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
sentencing him to the statutory prison term instead of placing him on
probation. He broadly argues that the trial court did not adequately weigh
his desire to conquer his meth addiction and put too much weight on his
poor supervision history, and the circumstances surrounding

the

aggravated robbery. But on this record, Defendant has not shown-and
cannot show - that no reasonable sentencing judge would conclude that
Defendant's repeated failures to change and the violent nature of the
aggravated robbery warranted imprisonment.

-8-

ARGUMENT
I.

The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Defendant to prison rather than placing him on
probation.

Defendant does not argue that the sentencing court failed to consider
any relevant factor. See Aplt.Br.7. Rather, Defendant asserts that the trial
court did not give enough weight to his "accomplishments while
incarcerated," his alleged "reentry plan," his desire "to address his meth
'·.-,\

\lifl

addiction problem, or the fact that he was on a waiting list for Odyssey
House. Aplt.Br.7. Defendant further suggests that the trial court gave too
much weight to his poor criminal history and the nature and circumstances
of the violent aggravated robbery.

Id.

Defendant has not shown-and

cannot show - that the court's balancing of these factors was unreasonable
and rendered the result inherently unfair.
"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the
defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system."

State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). That said, the court's
sentencing decision "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the
court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).

-9-

Sentencing courts traditionally have "wide latitude and discretion in
sentencing." State

v.

Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997). A sentence

will not be overturned unless the sentencing court bases its decision on
some wholly irrelevant or improper factor, fails to consider all legally
relevant factors, imposes a sentence that exceeds statutory or constitutional
limits, or otherwise rules in a manner so inherently unfair that the sentence
is an abuse of discretion. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, if8, 40 P.3d 626; State v.

Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957); State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, if 3,
73 P.3d 991.

And absent a showing to the contrary, this Court must

presume that the sentencing court considered all relevant factors and did
not consider irrelevant ones. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,r,rll-12; see also State v.

Robison, 2006 UT 65, ,J21, 147 P.3d 448 (discussing presumption of regularity
attaching to court rulings). In short, a sentencing court abuse does not
abuse its discretion unless "no reasonable [person] would take the view"
adopted by the sentencing court. State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, if 14,
82 P.3d 1167 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
Moreover, defendants have no right to probation. State v. Mungia,
2011 UT 5,

,r

24, 253 P.3d 1082. Rather, the sentencing court may grant

probation in its discretion. Id. That is because the "granting or withholding
of probation involves considering intangibles of character, personality and

-10-

attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling." Sibert, 310 P.2d at
393; accord State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, if58, 191 P.3d 17; see also State v.

Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[T]he discretionary
imposition of probation rests in many cases upon subtleties not apparent on
the face of a cold record ...."). Furthermore, these intangibles must be
"considered in connection with the prior record of the accused," Sibert, 310
P.2d at 393, along with considerations of "rehabilitation[,] ... deterrence,
punishment, restitution, and incapacitation," Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051.
Ultimately, the sentencing court must exercise its discretion in determining
what it believes "will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with
the public interest." Id.
As stated, Defendant does not claim that the trial court failed to
consider any required factor; rather, Defendant's complaint is that the court
did not adequately consider factors favorable to him. Aplt.Br.7. In other
words, Defendant disagrees with how the court assessed and weighed the
competing factors.

But mere disagreement with the sentencing court's

assessment is not enough.

Defendant must show that "no reasonable

[person] would take the view" adopted by that court. Valdovinos, 2003 UT
App 432, if14 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).
Defendant cannot 1nake that showing here.
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The trial court balanced the various factors weighing for and against
prison, including Defendant's poor criminal history (including three prior
revocations of probation and two violent felonies), and the violent nature of
the instant aggravated robbery. See R182; see also R187-201. The court also
considered

Defendant's

admission

that

he

was

addicted

to

methamphetamine, as well as his assertions that he was remorseful, that he
wanted to change and had conquered his other addictions, and that he was
on the waiting list for Odyssey House. See id. But the court implicitly found
Defendant incredible. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1988)
(noting appellate courts give "' due regard ... to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses'" (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a))).

It implicitly recognized

that Defendant had been given

opportunities to change in the past-and had squandered them. See R182.
The court thus concluded that it was time to move beyond probation and
ilnpose a more significant punishment for Defendant's violent crime:
Sir, I understand what you're saying, that you would like a
chance, but at some level I have to balance your interests with
the society-with society's interests, and I certainly do try that
in a lot of cases, and I'm willing to go out on a limb in the
appropriate case. Unfortunately, your history is such that I just
cannot do that. The nature of this crime is such- if, in fact, it is
(a] frightening crhne. You found someone, beat him up, and
stole his car, ran it into a telephone post. You're a danger, not
only to the person you beat up, but everybody on the road in
between as this chase occurred. You simply need to be in
-12-

Q

©

prison, and your history has shown that. That's what I have to
impose.

Id.
Given Defendant's poor criminal history, his admitted addiction to
methamphetamine, the fact that he had yet to be accepted to Odyssey
House, and the violent nature of the aggravated robbery here, Defendant
cannot show that no reasonable jurist would have committed him to prison.
Defendant points to nothing inherently unfair or unreasonable about
the court's conclusion that he had not earned the right to yet another chance
at probation-and State-provided inpatient substance abuse treatment-in
light of all the factors weighing in favor of imprisonment. See Killpack, 2008
UT 49, if59 ("[O]ne factor in 1nitigation or aggravation may weigh more
than several factors on the opposite scale." (internal quotation omitted)).
Nor is the prison sentence rendered an abuse of discretion by virtue of
Defendant's weighing the factors differently than the trial court.

See id.

'if'jf59-61 (rejecting defendant's claim that mitigating factors considered by

the sentencing court should have weighed in favor of probation). In short,
the trial court acted well within its discretion when it determined that
Defendant was a "danger" to society and needed to be in prison. R182.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on December 13, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MARCH 23, 2015

2

JUDGE PAUL B PARKER

3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. MACK: Judge, will you call the Richard Garcia

6
7

matter?

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

(Concludes previous case)
THE COURT: This is 141910607, State vs. Richard

10

11

Simon Garcia.

12

the State.

Mr. Cooley for

This is also a sentencing.

13

MR. MACK: Yes.

14

THE COURT: Are you Richard Simon Garcia?

15

DEFENDANT GARCIA: Yes, I am, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: All right.

17

MR. MACK: This is the time for sentencing, Your

18
/~

Mr. Mack for the defendant.

What are we doing?

Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the pre-sentence

19

11W

20

report?

21

MR. MACK: I do.

22

THE COURT: Any corrections or additions?

23

MR. MACK: No, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT: Go ahead then.

25

MR. MACK: Your Honor, we have a couple of requests.
1

First is we would ask you to consider sentencing

1
2

Mr. Garcia one degree lower to a one to 15.

3

list for inpatient treatment at the Odyssey House.

4

on the list for many months, but it does require almost a

5

year usually - nine, 10, 12 months to get into the program.

6

He's working his way up that list.

7

request, Your Honor.

8
9

He is on the
He's been

That is our first

Secondly, if I may approach to - I've shown these
to Mr. Cooley.

10

THE COURT: Certainly.

11

MR. MACK: If I can show you what he's been involved

12

in while he's been in custody?
He's taken advantage of any treatment opportunities

13
14

that have been available to him.

15

He's 45 years old.

He's getting to that point

16

where most people age out of criminal conduct.

And in this

17

case,

18

- and I think there's some mention by his part, but at least

19

in the police report, there's some mention of him having

20

taken a medication that he was unaware of.

I know that he has great remorse for his behavior.

21

THE COURT: Xanax?

22

MR. MACK: Yes, Xanax.

And, in fact, did enter a

23

plea in this case, but had very little memory of the

24

incident.

25

He

I guess, that's the second reason for - that we'd

~----------------r-'1·017~

1

ask you to consider sentencing in one degree lower.

He's

2

acknowledging responsibility.

3

he's not contesting that he did what he's accused of doing,

4

but he is saying that under usual circumstances and the

5

behavior that he's more recently been involved in, that this

6

would not have happened.

He was found in his car, and

Also, though, he recognizes that he has a substance

7
8

abuse issue.

9

methamphetamine.

10

Not for Xanax particularly, but for

He's been through and quit other substances during

11

his life.

12

tobacco.

13

stopped using or

didn't - had not stopped using

14

methamphetamine.

That's a difficult one to overcome, and he

15

is looking,

16

to address that, which in this case would be at the Odyssey

17

House.

18

He's stopped drinking.

He's stopped using

He's stopped using other drugs, but he has not

if he could, to enter a serious inpatient program

He's done a fair amount of time in jail on this.

19

He would also do a lot more jail before he would even be

20

eligible to go to the top of the list at Odyssey House.

21

That is our request, Your Honor.

22

THE COURT: The State?

23

MR. COOLEY: Your Honor, the State's joining that

24

you keep these recommendations.

25

history suggests that any sent - any other sentence would be

Nothing in the defendant's

3

1

appropriate.

It maxes out on the sentencing matrix with

2

landing firmly in the imprisonment category with the. 10 year

3

presumptive initial sentence.
On top of that, the conduct here - it's - arguably,

4

5

anything can fall under the header of drug induced activity,

6

but there are property crimes that people do in order to

7

obtain drugs, and then there are the crimes that the

8

defendant has committed, which were violent felonies.

9

obviously motivated by any sort of desire for drugs or any

10

Not

desire for anything other than to behave violently.
One of the cases was dismissed at preliminary

11
12

hearing, but the other, an aggravated burglary, was dismissed

13

in exchange for the plea in this case.
The defendant's history support the prison

14

15

sentence.

16

about drug use.

17

individual and represents a significant threat to society.

18

Imprisonment is the only appropriate sanction.

19

20
21

The defendant's conduct here doesn't say anything

THE COURT: Sir, is there anything you want to say
to me before I impose sentencing?

DEFENDANT GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor.

22

address this.

23

that, and I

24

address this.

25

It says the defendant's a dangerous

I do have a serious problem.

I'd like to
I understand

just would be - like to be given one chance to

I know that right before I came in here,

I

didn't

' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 0..rao~

1

have a problem with amphetamines.

And just as Mr. Mack said,

2

I don't really recollect anything, but I'm not trying to

3

minimize my crime or take anything away from Mr. King.
I pray every night that I - that what I did to this

4
5

gentleman, this young man, does not affect his life, and I

6

just want to - I'd like to address this one last issue.
I feel that if given one more chance or one

7

8

opportunity, I think that I can probably become a proper - a

9

very prosper - or a good part of society.

You know,

I

just

10

feel that given - I just -

11

federal prison, and I completed it, but that was in a

12

controlled environment.

13

would be would be out in the streets where there are other

14

controlled - where there's other substance is, where whatnot,

15

and that's where you really test my - show my - what I want

16

to do with my life and not just sit here and give you empty

17

promises.

18

I took a class when I was in a

I would - I know that a serious test

I know that given a chance -

I was - as I said

19

right before I came to jail - about six months before I came

20

to jail, I was enrolled to go to Stevens-Henager College, and

21

I -

22

live, and I'm not making excuses for my behavior.

23

something very terrible that I can never be excused for to

24

this young man.

25

just like I say,

I

just messed up.

I lost my place to

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

I did

Is the victim
5

OOt81

1

here that he would like to speak?

2

MR. MACK: He is not.

No, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: All right.

On the first degree felony

4

charge, I am going to impose five years to life in the Utah

5

State Prison, impose restitution in the amount of $10,350 to

6

Anthony King,

and $13,085.54 to Rocky Mountain Power.

Sir, I understand what you're saying, that you

7

8

would like a chance, but at some level I have to balance your

9

interests with the society - with society's interests,

and I

10

certainly do try that in a lot of cases, and I'm willing to

11

go out on a limb in the appropriate case.

12

your history is such that I

13

of this crime is such - if, in fact,

14

You found someone, beat him up, and stole his car, ran it

15

into a telephone post.

16

person you beat up, but everybody on the road in between as

17

this chase occurred.

18

your history has shown that.

Unfortunately,

just cannot do that.

The nature

it is frightening crime.

You're a danger, not only to the

You simply need to be in prison, and
That's what I have to impose.

19

DEFENDANT GARCIA: Okay.

20

THE COURT: So good luck to you, sir.

21

DEFENDANT GARCIA: May I ask for a forthwith,

22

Your

Honor?

23

THE COURT: A forthwith?

24

DEFENDANT GARCIA: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT: All right.

Absolutely.

(Concluded)

( 8-5-15)
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